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Abstract 
The study examined the existing practices of corporate governance (CG) as well as the relationship between family ownership 
and CG structure in Bangladesh. The study found that prevailing practices of CG were not in line with CG guidelines. 
Furthermore, the study found that family ownership had significant negative influence over board independence and board size, 
but a significant positive influence on dominant personality. These findings suggest that good governance is not possible under 
family based culture in Bangladesh. The findings of this study will contribute to the existing literature and suggest formulating a 
guideline that can ensure best CG practices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of family ownership on corporate governance (CG) is a hot issue of discussion in most of the 
contemporary business seminars and symposia in the third world including Bangladesh. Arcot and Bruno (2012) found 
that family firms are more likely to deviate from the standard of best practice in CG. In a survey about the possibility of 
ensuring good governance under family-based culture in Bangladesh, it is revealed that 58.42 percent respondents 
believe good governance is not possible (Hasan, 2013). The dominant legislations to govern the corporate environment 
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in Bangladesh include Securities & Exchange Ordinance 1969, Securities & Exchange Rules 1987, Bangladesh Bank 
Order 1972, Bank Companies Act 1991, Financial Institutions Act 1993, Securities & Exchange Commission Act 1993, 
Companies Act 1994, Bankruptcy Act 1997, Income Tax Ordinance 1984 and Circulars of Bangladesh Bank and 
Securities and Exchange Commission. To what extent these are comprehensive and applicable to ensure good 
governance in the corporate sector of Bangladesh is still a question of controversy. The CG guideline was first issued in 
2006 and it was revised in 2013 on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, providing some ‘breathing space’ for the companies to 
implement on the basis of their capability. Around 67 percent companies have adopted CG and 43 percent have 
compliance policy with national and international benchmarks though a considerable percentage of the top management 
does not fully understand the concept of CG (Du, 2006). One reason for the slow progress in adopting CG is that most 
companies are family oriented (85 percent). The family shareholders have incentives to expropriate minority 
shareholders or entrench themselves in managerial positions (Shleifier and Vishny, 1997). Such concentrated ownership 
structure affects the effectiveness of CG mechanism. Moreover, there are very few bonds or debt instruments in 
Bangladesh capital market and as such there is hardly any pressure group to enforce CG. The stock market scams in 
1996 and in 2010-2011 have seriously eroded the confidence of the investors and other corporate stakeholders. In this 
context, the research question that needs to be addressed is as follows:  Is there any influence of family ownership on 
CG in Bangladesh, a country dominant with family based culture? Hence, the objective of the study is to empirically 
examine the current CG practices as well as the influence of family ownership on CG using Bangladesh setting. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a literature review and hypotheses development and the 
following sections focus on the method, findings and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
 
Many studies have shown that dominant family shareholders are common in many countries, both developed (Faccio 
and Lang, 2002) and developing (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002), and that firm’s ownership structure has an 
important but ambiguous governance role (Shleifier and Vishny,1997). Ward (1991) argued that family firms are 
reluctant to appoint independent directors because they are afraid of losing control; disbelieve that non-executive 
directors understand the firm’s competitive situation; and afraid of opening up for external ideas and viewpoints. 
Confusing family and business matters, family owners could favor family interests over the firm’s interests because of 
loyalty toward family (Randoy, Jenssen,  and Goel, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003). In most of the family-
owned firms, the families generally prefer to establish boards that do not try to alleviate their discretion over decision-
making (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Boards are dominated by family members or close friends 
and there are few truly independent directors (Meng, 2009).  
The number of directors is an important factor in the effectiveness of the board. Some studies claim that family 
companies do have large boards, though a larger board size may bring a larger number of directors with experience 
(Xie, Davidson and  Dalt, 2001). Large board may represent a multitude of values (Halme and Huse, 1997). On the 
contrary, a reduced number of directors imply a high degree of coordination and communication between them and the 
managers (Jensen, 1993).  Borokhovich, Brunarski, Donahue and Harman (2006) argued that a small board is more 
effective than a larger one in making executive replacement decisions. Family firms have slightly smaller boards than 
non-family firms (Chen, Chen and Cheng, 2008). Sulong and Mat Nor (2009) claimed that firms with smaller boards 
are associated with less efficient use of assets and lower firm valuation. Johl, Jackling and Joshi (2010) found that 
Indian directors are not truly independent.   
CG literature has emphasized the need to separate the position of CEO and board chairman to ensure board 
independence and improve transparency (Jensen, 1993).  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) observed that the duality 
CEO-chairman increases the likelihood of violating the accounting principles in American firms. Byard, Li and 
Weintrop (2006) indicated that the presence of a CEO who serves also as the board chairman is associated with poor 
quality of financial information. A separate leadership role is found to be associated with higher performance than dual 
leadership (Berg and Smith, 1978; Daily and Dalton, 1994) and it could curb agency problems, and enhance firm value 
(Fama and Jensen,1983; Fosberg and Nelson, 1999). On the other side, the literature suggests that dual leadership 
enhances higher company performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Boyd, 1995). The company management is more 
efficient with a dual leadership role because of less bureaucracy and less information asymmetry (Haniffa and Cooke,  
2002). Duality leadership is a common practice in family firms despite the documented advantage of exercising a 
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separate leadership structure (Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong, 2005). CEOs of family companies are more 
concerned about the survival of their firms and protecting their legacy for future generations (Amran, 2010). However, 
studies have found that founder-managers that practice duality leadership could create even more serious agency 
problems in the companies (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001).   
Based on the above discussion this study has found that there are mixed findings on board independence, board size 
and dominant personality of corporate governance attributes on family business. Thus the following three hypotheses 
are formulated to test the relationship between family ownership and other corporate governance attributes:  
     H1: There is a significant relationship between family ownership and board independence. 
     H2: There is a significant relationship between family ownership and board size. 
     H3: There is a significant relationship between family ownership and dominant personality. 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1 Sample  
 
Sixty eight out of one hundred and fifty five non-financial companies listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) were 
taken as the sample for the current study based on the availability of corporate annual reports. The sample size was 44 
percent of the population.  
 
3.2 Variables and Measurement 
 
Dependent, independent and control variables were used to measure the influence of family ownership on corporate 
governance variables. A short description of variables and their measurement are presented in Table 1. Annual reports 
for the year 2010-11 of each of sample companies were used as data source. 
  
 Table 1: Concepts and measurement of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Label Measurement 
Family Ownership fo Code "1" for majority of shares held by family  and  " 0" otherwise  
Board Independence bi Number of independent non-executive directors divided by total number of directors on the board  
Board Size bs Number of the board of directors. 
Dominant Personality dp Code "1" if Chairman also holds the position of CEO and "0" otherwise 
Directors 
Compensations dc Actual amountdisbursed 
Institutional 
Ownership io 
Code "1" for shares held by institutions and "0" 
otherwise 
General Public gp Total number of shares held by outsiders divided by total number of  issued shares 
External Auditor ea Code "1" for internationally linked audit firm and "0" otherwise  
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3.3 Empirical Model 
 
A linear regression model was developed to measure the degree of influence of each CG attributes over family 
ownership. The β value of each CG attributes shows the degree and direction of influence on family ownership. The 
model is as follows: 
Where, fo =  Family ownership 
    α  = The intercept (constant) model 
    ε  = The unobserved variables 
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reveals that 85 percent of the sample companies had family ownership (fo) in the ownership structure. Thus, 
most of the listed companies in Bangladesh are one-man show, which is not a good indicator of CG as the internal 
control system is habitually weak in these entities and most of the decisions are taken from a personal perspective and 
authority is highly centralized. These organizations rarely offer a respectable working environment for professionals 
and only flatterers enjoy the job by flattering their boss. 
 
            Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CV 
Fo 68 0 1 0.85 0.36 0.42 
Bi 68 0 1 0.15 0.14 0.96 
Bs 68 3 17 7.4 2.29 0.31 
Dp 68 0 1 0.26 0.44 1.71 
Dc 57 12,000 46,59,30,00 61,73,947 97,38,179 1.58 
Ea 68 0 1 0.22 0.42 1.9 
Gp 68 0.05 0.94 0.41 0.22 0.53 
Io 68 0 0.86 0.2 0.21 1.07 
 
The average rate of board independence was 15 percent as against 20 percent as per CG guidelines (Subsection (i) of 
Section 1.2: Independent Directors). One independent director is required against four board members as per CG 
guidelines. But, this ratio had not been followed by many companies. Even some companies did not appoint 
independent directors and some companies had only one independent director against ten board members. But in 
Malaysia, if a company has only three board members, two of them are required to be independent (Bursa, Malaysia, 
2006).  
The average member of directors on the board is 7 as against the minimum number of 5 as per CG guidelines. The 
minimum number of directors of the sample companies was 3 as against 5 in CG guidelines (1.1 Board’s Size). So, 
many companies listed did not maintain the minimum required level of directors.   
On an average, 26 percent of the sample companies were operated by dominant personality, which is not a good sign 
for CG. In some cases, chairman and managing director are separate persons, but they came from the same family e.g., 
the father is the chairman and the son is the managing director. As per CG guidelines (1.4 Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer), the positions are filled by different persons, but it does not mention that they should not be 
family members. This is an inherent weakness of the CG guidelines.  For the sake of good governance, SEC should take 
necessary steps to eliminate CEO-chairman duality or family association between them and in this case, the excuse of 
financial burden is not acceptable.  
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4.2 Multicollinearity Analysis 
 
Pearson’s pair wise product moment correlation coefficient (r) was computed to examine the multicollinearity 
between variables, which are presented in Table-3. The highest number is 0.389 which existed between external auditor 
and institutional ownership. Some authors (for example: Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl and Lee, 1985; Bryman and 
Cramer, 1997) suggested that simple correlation between independent variables should not be considered harmful until 
and unless they exceed 0.80 or 0.90. Thus the observed correlations between independent variables were not considered 
harmful and this finding suggests that multicollinearity between independent variables is not a problem in the 
interpretation of the results of multivariate analysis. 
 
   Table 3. Correlations matrix 
 
Variables Bi Dp Bs Io gp Ea dc 
Bi 
1      
Dp 
-0.133 1     
Bs 
0.03 -0.061 1    
Io 
0.153 -0.17 0.092 1   
Gp 
-0.127 0.083 -0.104 -.410** 1  
Ea 
0.13 -0.158 .219* .389** -.306** 1 
Dc 
0.102 -0.137 .233* 0.094 -0.213 .229* 1 
 
4.3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
P value of Table 4 indicates that there is a significant relationship between family ownership and CG structures at 1 
percent level. This finding provokes further investigation to detect the level of significance of each CG variables over 
family ownership. Therefore, linear regression technique was used to develop an empirical model. 
 
Table 4: ANOVAb 
 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.924 7 0.561 6.356 .000a 
Residual 4.322 49 0.088     
Total 8.246 56       
a. Predictors: (Constant), bi, bs, dp, gp, dc, ea, io 
b. Dependent Variable: fo 
 
4.4 Empirical Model 
  
Table 5 shows that the beta value of board independence and board size is negative and beta value of dominant 
personality is positive. P value of board independence and board size indicates significant relationship with family 
ownership at 1 percent level. P value of dominant personality shows a significant relationship between dominant 
personality and family ownership at 10 percent level. Therefore, H1, H2 and H3 are accepted in this study. 
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Table 5. Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1.286 0.181   7.107 0 
Bi -0.789 0.274 -0.305 -2.881 0.006 
Bs -0.061 0.018 -0.359 -3.343 0.002 
Dp 0.159 0.095 0.18 1.667 0.102 
Dc 1.08E-09 0 0.028 0.248 0.806 
Ea -0.146 0.105 -0.165 -1.388 0.171 
Gp 0.371 0.193 0.223 1.918 0.061 
Io -0.132 0.205 -0.079 -0.643 0.523 
a. Dependent Variable: fo 
 
The most important CG variable is board independence. Effectiveness of board independence ensures transparency 
and accountability. The association between family ownership and board independence is significant at 1 percent level 
and it has a negative β. It indicates that board independence is impossible under family-based governance. More family 
ownership in the ownership structure means less independence of the board. This situation reduces the confidence of 
shareholders and others stakeholders (including the government) and in the long run, the organization may face trouble 
in doing business due to lack of good governance. Greater independence is required in the board room of both listed 
companies and state-owned enterprises to ensure good governance (World Bank, 2009).  Board size has an impact on 
transparency and accountability of CEO. Larger size of board is much more powerful than a small size board, but it is 
not always true as sometimes it may go beyond control. That is why it should be wiser to maintain a reasonable number 
of members in the board. The influence of family ownership on board size is statistically significant at 1 percent level 
and it has a negative β. It indicates family ownership discourages the inclusion of more independent members in the 
board in order to maintain their control in the business. Dominant personality is an important element of CG. If the 
same person holds both chairman and CEO positions then monitoring of CEO’s activities is difficult for the board. That 
is why dominant personality should be avoided to ensure transparency and accountability. The relationship between 
family ownership and dominant personality is significant at 10 percent level and it has a positive β. It indicates that 
family ownership ensures dominant personality which obstructs good CG.  They always try to keep control in their 
hands through violating the rules, regulations, norms, and usual business culture. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
The study concludes that there is an influence of family ownership over board independence, board size and 
dominant personality. Family ownership has significant negative impact on board independence and board size, but has 
significant positive impact on dominant personality. This finding tells us that it is unwise to expect good governance 
under family-based culture in the corporate sector in Bangladesh. Some authors believe family business is different 
from non-family business and they support dominant personality for ensuring monitoring activities instead of board 
independence. The study concludes that a standard of best practice of CG principles is urgently required for all of public 
limited companies to ensure transparency and accountability.   
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